Does Shafer-Landau Subjectively Support Moral Objectivity?

            In Chapter 21 of The Fundamentals of Ethics, author Russ Shafer-Landau describes the top ten arguments against moral objectivity. This chapter is structured similarly to the other chapters, except for the fact that an author bias is prominent for the first time. Back in Chapter 20, Shafer-Landau foreshadowed his personal ethical stance in his conclusion when he does not completely rule out the nihilism point of view, “Most of us (especially we textbook authors!) hope this isn’t so.” (Shafer-Landau 2010, 318)

In this conclusion, Shafer-Landau states that, “Our discussion of these ten arguments has not revealed a single one that confirms the existence of objective moral values.” (Shafer-Landau 2010, 337) However, in this chapter the author does a great job of disproving the arguments against objectivism. At the beginning of this section, Shafer-Landau easily discredits the more popular arguments against objectivism. Nevertheless, the arguments against objectivism escalate in complexity as the chapter progresses. In this post, I will be discussing Shafer-Landau’s successful disproval of the moral skeptic argument that moral motivation undermines moral objectivity and how this example reflects his ethical stance.

Shafer-Landau begins this passage by conveying the moral skeptic’s point of view. He first describes moral judgments as feelings that motivate us to act in a certain way. He then contrasts this with a definition of beliefs, “They are focused on stating the facts, on reporting the truth, on describing reality.” (Shafer-Landau 2010, 332) The purpose of this exercise was to distinguish belief from motivation. This is the basis for the moral skeptic argument for the disproval of moral objectivity through motivation.

Shafer-Landau contradicts two different premises of the moral skeptic argument against objectivism. One such premise is, “moral judgments are able, all by themselves, to motivate those who make them.” (Shafer Landau 2010, 332) Shafer-Landau disproves this premise by introducing the ideology of amorality. Amoralists can judge things to be moral or not, but then let this have no effect on what their ensuing actions are. For example, I can believe that owning a gun is wrong because it endangers the people around me. If I am amoral however, I may go out one day and purchase a gun simply because I want one. Although I think it is wrong, I did not let my negative moral judgment on guns affect my actions to purchase one. The amoralist ideology successfully contradicts the moral skeptic premise of moral judgments all by themselves being able to motivate those who make them.

Shafer-Landau then goes on to disprove of another premise in the argument against moral objectivity. This moral skeptic premise states, “Beliefs are never able, all by themselves, to motivate those who hold them.” (Shafer-Landau 2010, 332) Shafer-Landau argues that reason, or belief, actually can tell us what is right and wrong. This argument is supported by the Kantian Perspective, wherein Kant states, “When acting from the good will, we are acting solely from an understanding of what is morally required of us, not from any desire or emotion.” (Shafer-Landau 2010, 175) According to Kant, we can think rationally and discover what is morally required of us by attempting to be self-governing and impartial. In fact, our emotions might even lead us into doing something that is immoral: “They need to be guided by sound principles before we can trust them.” (Shafer-Landau 2010, 174)

After disproving two premises, it is clear that Shafer-Landau has successfully contradicted the argument that moral motivation undermines moral objectivity. This disproval of arguments against moral objectivity exemplifies what the author has done throughout this chapter in regards to other similar arguments. Even though Shafer-Landau does not give reasons why moral objectivity is true, I believe that he clearly supports this ideology. He foreshadowed his stance in the previous chapter on nihilism, and then proceeded to disprove every argument against objectivity. I believe that he has not yet declared his support of moral objectivity in an attempt to remain neutral and not discourage some of his readers as he discusses all of the possible differing moral views.

Works Cited

1.     Landau, Russ. The Fundamentals of Ethics. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.