Russ
Shafer-Landau argues that the notion of impartiality is both good and
bad for the theory of utilitarianism. Utilitarianism holds that
well-being “is the only thing that is intrinsically valuable”,
and that “an action us morally required just because it does more
to improve overall well-being than any other action you could have
done in the circumstances” (Shafer-Landau, 120). In part, this
sub-theory is constructed around the idea of impartiality in how we
treat all others. As Shafer-Landau argues, it seems right that we
favor those closest to us over those that we do not know. Still, he
makes an argument about the flaw in this notion in an example about
slavery. Shafer-Landau argues that, since utilitarianism considers
everyone's well-being equally, if enough people in a society held
onto the idea of slavery it could be “required” that the society
continue the practice. It seems that, upon weighing all of the harms
to slaves and benefits to slave owners with one another, if more
benefits seem to come from the act, then the act is required by
utilitarianism. This shows a major drawback to the theory as a whole.
Showing posts with label Utilitarianism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Utilitarianism. Show all posts
Tuesday, April 9, 2013
Saturday, April 6, 2013
Utilitarianism: The Problem With the View of Actual Results
In The Fundamentals of Ethics, Russ Shafer-Landau spends a chapter focusing on act utilitarianism, a version of consequentialism. In the chapter he discusses the structure of act utilitarianism and its principle of maximizing goodness. He also provides some of the attractions of Utilitarianism and the scope of Utilitarianism. What I plan to focus on however is the Utilitarian view of moral knowledge and the problem of using expected results over actual results when committing moral actions.
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