Showing posts with label ethical subjectivism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ethical subjectivism. Show all posts

Friday, February 15, 2013

Nihilism, Objectivism, Relativism...Which Way Are You Leaning?

In class today, we left off at the start of a very interesting discussion. After reading the arguments for and against each philosophical view, we were asked where we saw our own views falling into place. There didn't seem to be any one theory that had overwhelming support behind it, nor one theory in which the entire class had completely dismissed.

At the start of this class, I was more of a subjectivist. For me, morality was all relative and no one person's moral principles could be superior to another's. In this belief I was grounded-- that is-- until we studied Shafer-Landau's chapter on "Ethical Relativism". Unable to refute the arguments raised by the author to my views, I turned to outside literature, but still was unable to come up with anything that could hold up against these objections. Now, however, I feel that my personal views may lie closer to those posed within nilhilism's error theory. The fact-value distinction in which Shafer-Landau notes drew me into nihilism (306). Also, since I agree that moral claims are "truth apt" yet all false because of the nonexistence of moral truths, error theory was more appealing than expressivism.

Tuesday, February 5, 2013

A Personal Look on Ethical Subjectivism


According to an argument by Russ Shafer-Landau, the moral outlook of someone like Hitler is “just as plausible” as the moral outlook of a Nobel Peace laureate like Nelson Mandela-- if you subscribe to the view of ethical subjectivism (Shafer-Landau, 294). Ethical subjectivism is one of two branches of ethical relativism, which holds that moral standards are relative to an individual's or a society's own principles (290). Shafer-Landau breaks down the reasoning of ethical subjectivists into two simple parts: if a person approves of the act, it is morally acceptable; or if a person's own principles allow the act, then it is morally acceptable (291). On the other side of this, the act is wrong if the person disapproves, or if the person's own principles in which they stand forbid the act (291).

Let's return to the provocative example that opened this post. An ethical subjectivist (however daring) may argue that, since Hitler's own principles allowed him to proceed with the events of the Holocaust, or simply because he himself approved of the act, then the killing of the Jews was a morally acceptable action. Perhaps surprisingly, subjectivists can also grant validity to any person's moral beliefs that oppose the aforementioned one. This is because, as Shafer-Landau points out, subjectivism “is a doctrine of moral equivalence”, so one person's moral view is no better than another's (293).


Sunday, February 3, 2013

Can Ethics Be Objective? Analysis of Ethical Relativism

Can ethics be objective?  Russ Shafer-Landau analyzes this question, in The Fundamental Of Ethics, by critiquing the arguments of ethical relativism.   Ethical relativism is divided into two subtypes; cultural relativism and ethical subjectivism.  The cultural relativists argue that correct moral standards are decided by each culture or society (291).  In contrast, ethical subjectivists claim that each individual decides which moral standards are correct (291).  Landau tests each claim made by these theories through a series of logical tests. Although I will focus only on cultural relativism, the critiques of both groups' claims illustrate that their skepticism towards ethical objectivity is not plausible.