Bambrough's Evaluation of Typical Argument Against Moral Knowledge

Shafer-Landau's compilation of ethical readings, The Ethical Life, contains an excerpt from Renford Bambrough's 1979 book Moral Skepticism and Moral Knowledge in which Bambrough presents and tries to debunk five typical arguments moral skeptics use to deny the possibility of moral knowledge. In addition he also offers his own argument for the existence of moral knowledge.

The argument that Bambrough uses to try to prove the existence of moral knowledge is demonstrated by a very simple scenario he gives us to think about. The scenario is that there is a small child about to undergo a painful surgery and the question whether he should be given anesthesia or not. Bambrough argues that there is no scenario where not giving the child the anesthesia is morally correct. (Bambrough 1979). I agree with Bambrough's argument for the most part but I have some questions regarding it.  I'm not entirely sure these are relevant questions or factors he assumes away when making his argument. What if the child is allergic to the anesthesia and giving it to him will lead his death? I don't see how it would be morally right to give him the anesthesia under these circumstances unless you try to argue that it is more humane, and in turn morally correct, to essentially euthanize the child than to perform the surgery without anesthesia. This seems like one of the only situations where taking the anesthesia option is the morally wrong one and so I'm inclined to believe that Bambrough assumes this is not the case as his example is trying to prove a deeper truth.

The first argument that Bambrough evaluates is based on the claim that there is more moral disagreement present than there is disagreement on facts. He disputes this claim by first saying that it may very well be false because there are, and have been historically, many facts disputed by scientists and other researchers. He offers us the example of cosmologists' and radio astronomers' different interpretations of certain radioastronomical observations. He then goes on to say that, even if true, this claim is irrelevant to the question of the existence of moral knowledge  His reasoning is that the level of disagreement on a given topic does not dismiss the possibility that one side of the argument is the right and the other wrong (Bambrough 1979). It seems to me that there is more argument present, at least in my everyday life, in the field of ethics than in other sciences such as physics and chemistry. However, I do believe that Bambrough is right in saying that the level of disagreement, and this particular argument against moral knowledge, is irrelevant to whether one party is right and the other wrong as well as the existence of moral knowledge.

The second argument that Bambrough challenges is that our moral opinions are just products of our culture and growing environment. He does this by first going back to the last argument about how just because there may be disagreement, including that which stems from cultural reason, about an issue doesn't mean that one party is right and the other wrong. He also mentions that we do not become skeptical of the objectivity of scientific truths just because one culture may dispute or deny them (Bambrough 1979).  I buy the argument that when two people disagree on a moral issue because of cultural reason one of them could still be right and the other wrong because there are examples, such as the one of the child, surgery, and anesthesia that Bambrough gives us, that seem to supersede any cultural beliefs.

The third argument Bambrough disputes is that there can be no moral knowledge because moral claims are just statements of opinion. He argues this by saying that every statement, even those that are facts, are proclamations of one's opinion and this does not disqualify them from being objectively true or false. He goes on to say that the most important factor in these cases is the distinction between appearance and reality (Bambrough 1979). I also agree with this reasoning because I agree with the idea that someone believing in something does not mean it is nothing more than their opinion and could very well be a true fact.

The fourth argument the Bambrough questions is that because there is a point in every moral dispute when further reasoning is impossible there must not be any moral knowledge. His reasoning why this is false is that some people may not believe a certain thing under any circumstance and there is nothing that can force them to but that doesn't make it not true. A line that he uses that I particularly liked was: "Nothing can be proved to a man who will accept nothing that has not been proved" (Bambrough 1979). I agree with this simply because I find it true, including through some of my personal experiences, that some people may never be convinced of something, including facts, that may turn out to be true. I recently had an argument with my roommate about something that I knew to be an absolute fact. By the end of it he was still not convinced I was correct on the issue but it didn't make the fact I was arguing for any less of a fact.

The fifth and final argument that Bambrough analysis is that there is no moral knowledge because there are no recognized methods for settling moral disputes the way there are in settling factual and logical disputes. He counters this argument by saying that it is either false or irrelevant  He states that it is false because there are recognized methods of arguing about morality such as the consistency requirement to which he gives the example of asking someone the question 'How would you like it if someone did this to you?' He then goes on to talk about how many of the people who raise this argument in the first place don't accept any methods of argument unless they are recognized methods of factual or logical argument. This then makes their argument circular and false. He then states that the argument is irrelevant because recognized methods of factual or logical argument can fail to convince their target without being guilty of falsehood (Bambrough 1979). This is very similar to the reasoning he uses to find the fourth argument he evaluates false. I am convinced by Bambrough's reasoning this time as well because I agree that there are methods of arguing about morality.