In
chapter eleven Russ Shafer-Landau summarizes, and then points out a fatal flaw
of Immanuel Kant’s principle of universalizability. Kant was staunchly opposed
to utilitarianism. The primary reason for this seems to be that he disagreed
with the idea of consequentialism; rather he believed that the morality of an
action was largely dependent on its maxim. A maxim, as Shafer-Landau describes
it, is “what you are about to do, and why you are about to do it.”
(Shafer-Landau 2010, 157-158) This view is perhaps more forgiving in a sense,
because it forgives someone whose well-intentioned act produced harmful
results. Also, unlike utilitarianism, Kant’s view saves people from having to
consider every possible outcome of every decision they make. Kant’s criteria
for whether or not an action is morally correct is that it must be universalizable.
Kant outlined an easy test to determine if this is the case. First one has to
determine their maxim, and imagine a hypothetical world in which everyone
accepts and follows that same maxim. If that action could still be successfully
carried out in a world where everyone else has the same goals, then that action
is universalizible. (Shafer-Landau 2010, 159)
The principle of universalizabity works
well in matters of environmentalism. For example, consider someone who wanted
to buy a Hummer. This would fail to pass Kant’s test of universalizabilty,
because not everyone on earth could drive a Hummer, unless of course they built
a Hummer that works underwater. Or if someone wanted to pollute the water
because it was convenient, that would not be universalizable, since it would
likely mean that there would be no clean water left, and everyone would die.
Unfortunately, as Shafer-Landau points out, this methodology
only seems to address one specific type of immoral action: the kind that is
self-serving, and acts as though the person committing the act was superior to
others, or at least not bound by the same moral rules. This is neglecting
several other genres of unethical actions, including but not limited to actions
that seek to harm specific individuals or groups. (Shafer-Landau 2010, 165) I
noticed that Kant’s principle would also not prevent systematic, wordwide
immoral actions. For example, the maxim ‘I am going to murder people at random
because I want to destroy all human life’ is easily universalizible. If
everyone shared that maxim, they would need only to commit suicide, and the goal
would be completed. However, random murder is pretty easily recognizable as an
unethical act.
Kant’s
view, as Shafer-Landau points out, is narrow and idealistic. It fails to
recognize the complexities of people’s motives. This is further shown by the
fact that Kant praised integrity as being the most important virtue. (Shafer-Landau 2010, 165) This
might be the case, if everyone had similar and universalizible intentions,
which is obviously not the case. A white supremacist who staunchly adheres to
their racist principles is still a white supremacist; if anything, their
integrity in that case would make them worse. Kant seems to have an interesting
idea of ethics, but one that is limited by his flawed view of human nature.
Works Cited
Landau, Russ. "Chapter 11-The Kantian Perspective-Fairness and Justice." In The Fundamentals of Ethics. Second ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 154-167.
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.