Showing posts with label Shafer-Landau. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Shafer-Landau. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 23, 2013

Deontology, Rights, and Meat Consumption

In his article, "Vegetarianism, Causation and Ethical Theory", Russ Shafer-Landau argues that consequentialism and deontological ethics both fail to explain why one should not consume meat. He notes the shift from arguments against factory farming practices to ones that argue against meat consumption, but in his opinion, these issues are "separable", and so the latter deserves its own set of arguments (Shafer-Landau, 85). After arguing against the consequentialist view, Shafer-Landau asks: "if we do not tie moral imperatives to benefits or harms, what are they tied to?" (92). For a deontologist, the answer to this may be that moral imperatives are tied to rights. The author states that there are two views as to why this is so. The first view, which Shafer-Landau calls the "interest view" states that our rights exist as protection of our interests, and that rights violations translate to a "setback" of our interests (92). The second view, called the "autonomy view", states that rights allow us to do as we choose, and that violations of our rights is an infringement of our autonomy (92). The author states that if we believe that permanently comatose individuals have rights, then one may have valid doubts about the autonomy view (93). Obviously, this is because these individuals have lost the ability to do as they choose which goes against the definition of the autonomy view.

False Hope:  Vegetarianism and Animal Cruelty

Animal rights is a very controversial topic especially pertaining to factory farms.  Animals at such facilities are often subjected to harsh treatment during their lives so that they can be slaughtered and sold for human consumption.  In effect, someone must be held responsible for how these animals are treated.  Russ Shafer-Landau explores the various arguments pertaining to animal cruelty in his article "Vegetarianism, Causation, and Ethical Theory".  He critiques two versions of the consequentialists' arguments towards meat eating which he dubbed the "...Inefficacy Argument..." (Shafer-Landau, 1994).

Monday, April 22, 2013

Kant's Vegetarianism


            With vegetarianism becoming a hot trend in today’s society, it is fitting that many philosophers have examined its counterpart, meat eating, and analyzed its morality under different ethical lenses. Shafer-Landau is one of those philosophers. In his paper “Vegetarianism, Causation and Ethical Theory”, Shafer-Landau evaluates which ethical theory produces the strongest argument against meat-eating and animal suffering in factory farms. Although he believes his argument using virtue ethics is by far his strongest, I see his method of Kantian ethics in reference to universalization being the greatest proof to abstain from eating meat.

Tuesday, April 16, 2013

Kant's Fairness and Justice and Kim Jong Un


While reviewing chapter 11, “The Kantian perspective” in Russ Shafer-Landau’s The Fundamentals of Ethics, I was reminded of the recent threats to the international community and the United States in particular by Kim Jong Un and North Korea.
            A yahoo news article by Foster Klug of the Associated Press describes Kim Jong Un’s ‘against the grain’ behavior in his title, “Pivotal NKorea Question: What is Kim Thinking?” Recently, under Kim’s heavy hand, the United States has faced threats from North Korea of nuclear holocaust with the potential for another Korean War. David Shlapak notes that this particular crisis is different than most because of  “our lack of insight… into Kim’s mind”. If he were to follow in his father’s footsteps, he’d try to push negotiations just as far as he could to receive the maximum amount of foreign aid. Most do believe, however, that Kim’s methods are more closely related to scare tactics but it is hard to be sure as he is such a young leader.

Tuesday, April 9, 2013

Utilitarianism and Impartiality


Russ Shafer-Landau argues that the notion of impartiality is both good and bad for the theory of utilitarianism. Utilitarianism holds that well-being “is the only thing that is intrinsically valuable”, and that “an action us morally required just because it does more to improve overall well-being than any other action you could have done in the circumstances” (Shafer-Landau, 120). In part, this sub-theory is constructed around the idea of impartiality in how we treat all others. As Shafer-Landau argues, it seems right that we favor those closest to us over those that we do not know. Still, he makes an argument about the flaw in this notion in an example about slavery. Shafer-Landau argues that, since utilitarianism considers everyone's well-being equally, if enough people in a society held onto the idea of slavery it could be “required” that the society continue the practice. It seems that, upon weighing all of the harms to slaves and benefits to slave owners with one another, if more benefits seem to come from the act, then the act is required by utilitarianism. This shows a major drawback to the theory as a whole.

Saturday, April 6, 2013

Utilitarianism: The Problem With the View of Actual Results

In The Fundamentals of Ethics, Russ Shafer-Landau spends a chapter focusing on act utilitarianism, a version of consequentialism. In the chapter he discusses the structure of act utilitarianism and its principle of maximizing goodness. He also provides some of the attractions of Utilitarianism and the scope of Utilitarianism. What I plan to focus on however is the Utilitarian view of moral knowledge and the problem of using expected results over actual results when committing moral actions.

Tuesday, February 19, 2013

Nihilism and The World Around You


Shafer-Landau in chapter 20 of the Fundamentals of Ethics describes moral nihilism as those who “deny that there are any moral qualities (Shafer-Landau 306).” To simplify what Shafer-Landau said moral nihilism is the belief that says that nothing is right or wrong that there are no good or bad moral actions only facts. Shafer-argues this point by expressing that “Facts exists; values don’t” like the table is made of wood would be an acceptable fact, but since “values cannot be factual, and so cannot be true (Shafer-Landau 306).”
Take a moment close your eyes and think of a World without morals. To today’s standard it would be a world of chaos and something straight out of one of the many post apocalyptic movies where the value of human life is the cost of a bullet or a movement of a blade through human flesh. Every man, woman, and child exist in a world where they have to take what you can for yourself before some one else takes it for themselves World. This is what I believed was the fatal flaw “if widespread acceptance of a moral theory would yield disastrous results, then that theory is false (Shafer-Landau 310).”  As you can see from how I picture it moral nihilism would result in disastrous results and therefore has proven to be false.
 But Shafer-Landau points out a very interesting argument. For instance if celibacy is moral and everybody practiced it and refrained from having sex, then no babies would be born, therefore the worlds population would start decreasing. With a continued decrease in population and no babies to fill the void of the dead, towns would die out followed soon by cities then countries and finally the entire human population of the World. This is if I am not mistaken a disastrous result from following a moral theory that is widely accepted and hasn’t been proven to be false yet. Therefore the argument of disastrous result cannot be used to disprove of the moral theory of moral nihilism.
The next way I tried to disprove moral nihilism is the fact that people are moral in their ways of life but some are just more apparent than others. So I sat down by the Hub and watched people’s actions for a while. I saw a guy pick up a book that a girl dropped talked to her for a while wrote down her number and parted ways surely that is a sign or morals, helping someone without asking for anything in return. But then after thinking for a while this action could be interpreted as a guy trying to get something for himself, in this case the woman’s number, instead of helping someone else out.

Friday, February 15, 2013

Nihilism, Objectivism, Relativism...Which Way Are You Leaning?

In class today, we left off at the start of a very interesting discussion. After reading the arguments for and against each philosophical view, we were asked where we saw our own views falling into place. There didn't seem to be any one theory that had overwhelming support behind it, nor one theory in which the entire class had completely dismissed.

At the start of this class, I was more of a subjectivist. For me, morality was all relative and no one person's moral principles could be superior to another's. In this belief I was grounded-- that is-- until we studied Shafer-Landau's chapter on "Ethical Relativism". Unable to refute the arguments raised by the author to my views, I turned to outside literature, but still was unable to come up with anything that could hold up against these objections. Now, however, I feel that my personal views may lie closer to those posed within nilhilism's error theory. The fact-value distinction in which Shafer-Landau notes drew me into nihilism (306). Also, since I agree that moral claims are "truth apt" yet all false because of the nonexistence of moral truths, error theory was more appealing than expressivism.

Tuesday, February 5, 2013

A Personal Look on Ethical Subjectivism


According to an argument by Russ Shafer-Landau, the moral outlook of someone like Hitler is “just as plausible” as the moral outlook of a Nobel Peace laureate like Nelson Mandela-- if you subscribe to the view of ethical subjectivism (Shafer-Landau, 294). Ethical subjectivism is one of two branches of ethical relativism, which holds that moral standards are relative to an individual's or a society's own principles (290). Shafer-Landau breaks down the reasoning of ethical subjectivists into two simple parts: if a person approves of the act, it is morally acceptable; or if a person's own principles allow the act, then it is morally acceptable (291). On the other side of this, the act is wrong if the person disapproves, or if the person's own principles in which they stand forbid the act (291).

Let's return to the provocative example that opened this post. An ethical subjectivist (however daring) may argue that, since Hitler's own principles allowed him to proceed with the events of the Holocaust, or simply because he himself approved of the act, then the killing of the Jews was a morally acceptable action. Perhaps surprisingly, subjectivists can also grant validity to any person's moral beliefs that oppose the aforementioned one. This is because, as Shafer-Landau points out, subjectivism “is a doctrine of moral equivalence”, so one person's moral view is no better than another's (293).