Deontology, Rights, and Meat Consumption

In his article, "Vegetarianism, Causation and Ethical Theory", Russ Shafer-Landau argues that consequentialism and deontological ethics both fail to explain why one should not consume meat. He notes the shift from arguments against factory farming practices to ones that argue against meat consumption, but in his opinion, these issues are "separable", and so the latter deserves its own set of arguments (Shafer-Landau, 85). After arguing against the consequentialist view, Shafer-Landau asks: "if we do not tie moral imperatives to benefits or harms, what are they tied to?" (92). For a deontologist, the answer to this may be that moral imperatives are tied to rights. The author states that there are two views as to why this is so. The first view, which Shafer-Landau calls the "interest view" states that our rights exist as protection of our interests, and that rights violations translate to a "setback" of our interests (92). The second view, called the "autonomy view", states that rights allow us to do as we choose, and that violations of our rights is an infringement of our autonomy (92). The author states that if we believe that permanently comatose individuals have rights, then one may have valid doubts about the autonomy view (93). Obviously, this is because these individuals have lost the ability to do as they choose which goes against the definition of the autonomy view.

Utilitarianism and Impartiality

Russ Shafer-Landau argues that the notion of impartiality is both good and bad for the theory of utilitarianism. Utilitarianism holds that well-being “is the only thing that is intrinsically valuable”, and that “an action us morally required just because it does more to improve overall well-being than any other action you could have done in the circumstances” (Shafer-Landau, 120). In part, this sub-theory is constructed around the idea of impartiality in how we treat all others. As Shafer-Landau argues, it seems right that we favor those closest to us over those that we do not know. Still, he makes an argument about the flaw in this notion in an example about slavery. Shafer-Landau argues that, since utilitarianism considers everyone's well-being equally, if enough people in a society held onto the idea of slavery it could be “required” that the society continue the practice. It seems that, upon weighing all of the harms to slaves and benefits to slave owners with one another, if more benefits seem to come from the act, then the act is required by utilitarianism. This shows a major drawback to the theory as a whole.

Fertility Tourism and the Ethics of Intercountry Surrogacy

Intercountry surrogacy: an opportunity for economic improvement in the lives of the poor or a new, exploitative practice that exerts patriarchal control over women's bodies? This is one of the fundamental questions that speaker Molly Shanley explored in her topic, "Fertility Tourism and the Ethics of Intercountry Surrogacy: Renting Wombs in the Global Marketplace". For her, intercountry surrogacy has many positive aspects to it, including that the woman is able to exercise personal agency in that she has control over the decision to do with her body what she chooses. In this case, she chooses to "rent" out her womb in the hopes of improving her economic situation. Since many surrogates are chosen from the Global South to become surrogates for people of the Global North, there is this opportunity for them to make a substantial amount of money that has the potential to change their lives. This is also helpful for many families and individuals of the Global North that cannot afford, or are unwilling to pay the much higher costs for surrogacy within their own countries. Shanley admits that more work needs to be done to study whether or not these surrogates' lives are actually improved after they have performed these services. As of right now, it is unclear.

What If the Anesthesia Put Others at Risk?

In “Proof”, written by Renford Bambrough, a scenario is proposed in support of the existence of moral knowledge. Bambrough poses that there is a child in need of surgery that would be painful for him in the absence of anesthesia, and as Bambrough sees it, there is not doubt that this child should receive it (as cited in Shafer-Landau, 2012, p.218). As someone with beliefs more aligned with moral skepticism, I wondered whether or not this really was objective proof of moral truths. As risky as it may be, I thought that I would at least enter the conversation on this matter.

Just today I found an article about the health risks to recovery room hospital staff associated with exposure to waste anesthetic gas exhaled by recovering patients (Cook, 2013). “Beware the Hidden Dangers of Anesthesia” starts off by stating that anesthesia in the operating room isn't the only area where these gases can cause harm, and that even nurses in the recovery room may be at risk of exposure to these gases which have potentially harmful health effects (Cook, 2013). These effects include mild problems such as nausea and headaches, but also more serious complications like sterility, miscarriages, cancer, and liver disease (Cook, 2013). The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health claims that this problem is even more pronounced in facilities that lack proper ventilation, and the organization also suggests that systems be developed that monitor the concentration level of anesthetic gases in breathing zones (Cook, 2013).

Nihilism, Objectivism, Relativism...Which Way Are You Leaning?

In class today, we left off at the start of a very interesting discussion. After reading the arguments for and against each philosophical view, we were asked where we saw our own views falling into place. There didn't seem to be any one theory that had overwhelming support behind it, nor one theory in which the entire class had completely dismissed.

At the start of this class, I was more of a subjectivist. For me, morality was all relative and no one person's moral principles could be superior to another's. In this belief I was grounded-- that is-- until we studied Shafer-Landau's chapter on "Ethical Relativism". Unable to refute the arguments raised by the author to my views, I turned to outside literature, but still was unable to come up with anything that could hold up against these objections. Now, however, I feel that my personal views may lie closer to those posed within nilhilism's error theory. The fact-value distinction in which Shafer-Landau notes drew me into nihilism (306). Also, since I agree that moral claims are "truth apt" yet all false because of the nonexistence of moral truths, error theory was more appealing than expressivism.

A Personal Look on Ethical Subjectivism

According to an argument by Russ Shafer-Landau, the moral outlook of someone like Hitler is “just as plausible” as the moral outlook of a Nobel Peace laureate like Nelson Mandela-- if you subscribe to the view of ethical subjectivism (Shafer-Landau, 294). Ethical subjectivism is one of two branches of ethical relativism, which holds that moral standards are relative to an individual's or a society's own principles (290). Shafer-Landau breaks down the reasoning of ethical subjectivists into two simple parts: if a person approves of the act, it is morally acceptable; or if a person's own principles allow the act, then it is morally acceptable (291). On the other side of this, the act is wrong if the person disapproves, or if the person's own principles in which they stand forbid the act (291).

Let's return to the provocative example that opened this post. An ethical subjectivist (however daring) may argue that, since Hitler's own principles allowed him to proceed with the events of the Holocaust, or simply because he himself approved of the act, then the killing of the Jews was a morally acceptable action. Perhaps surprisingly, subjectivists can also grant validity to any person's moral beliefs that oppose the aforementioned one. This is because, as Shafer-Landau points out, subjectivism “is a doctrine of moral equivalence”, so one person's moral view is no better than another's (293).