The Imprecise Measurement of Well-Being

In chapter 10 of The Fundamentals of Ethics, Russ Shafer-Landau presents several challenges to consequentialism. Shafer-Landau sets up each of his arguments by first presenting each popular argument against consequentialism, then posing the strongest consequentialist counter argument and ends each argument by evaluating the validity of the argument. Aside from the problem of ignoring justice, one of the strongest objections to consequentialism was the indeterminate measurement system for wellbeing. The argument is that since there is no physical scale to measure the value of an action, utilitarianism is false (Shafer-Landau 136). The counterargument that utilitarians present is that by comparing scenarios that cause harm and benefit, actions can be categorized with respect to one another and this does not require situations to have numerical values. For instance, Shafer-Landau explains how the harm caused by a cholera outbreak is obviously far greater than the harm caused by a husband cursing his wife (Shafer-Landau 136). Even though there is no clear numerical value placed on an action, by comparing actions to one another, we are able to compare our options to determine which action is more favorable than the other.  He ends with the point that although this may be true in some cases, the majority of dilemmas in the real world are not as cut and dry. The most optimific act is usually unclear because we can be dealing with two situations that could similarly produce some benefit at the cost of some harm. In these situations the most optimific result becomes more about interpretation. Since the net optimific act then becomes unclear, this is why it can be argued that utilitarianism does not always give a clear answer and does not explain how we should decide when faced with a multifaceted dilemma. 

I agree with Shafer-Landau that in complex situations, consequentialism does not offer any helpful guidance. A utilitarian’s goal is to create the greatest amount of net well-being but it assumes that wellbeing is the same for everyone. My definition of net wellbeing could be something completely different than your definition. Suppose that you were given the chance to donate a million dollars to one and only one charity. According to utilitarianism, you should donate this money to the organization that will produce the most net wellbeing. Suppose that you had to choose between two highly regarded organizations aimed at the same goal: finding foster homes for abused offspring. The only difference was that one organization worked towards finding homes for abused children while the other organization worked towards finding homes for abused cats. Furthermore, suppose that if the million dollars does not reach the cats, then 50 cats will be put to death because feeding and providing for the cats is monetarily too much for this organization.  The child abuse organization is not on the verge of bankruptcy and the children’s lives are not in danger but the million dollars would definitely help the organization to spread awareness and significantly increase the number of children finding loving homes. Since utilitarians argue for marginal cases, the belief that a cat’s life is worth less than a human’s cannot be justification for your decision. With that in mind, from a utilitarian standpoint, both donations would produce benefits but both contain the above mentioned costs. What do you do?

In situations such as this, it becomes very difficult to determine a net wellbeing and turning to utilitarianism for guidance gives no concrete correct answer. Would the cost of 10, 20, or 100 cats per day morally justify donating to that organization over the child adoption organization? On one hand, you have to think of the possible benefits to society that one of those children could make by being given a chance to grow up with a loving family. But do not forget that the cats are innocent baby kittens on the verge of painful death. The point of this dilemma was to show that utilitarianism gives a correct answer only when faced with straightforward problems that have an obvious moral hierarchy. Where utilitarianism fails to guide us is when we are faced with more complex moral dilemmas that contain some benefits and some harm.