Chapter 10 of The Fundamentals of Ethics by Shafer Landau discusses various difficulties of consequentialism, particularly utilitarianism. Some problems include the absence of an accurate measurement of well-being, the demanding nature of utilitarianism, the problem of injustice and the rejection of intrinsic values. Among those challenges, utilitarianism’ denial of an action having intrinsic wrongness of rightness has drawn my attention. Utilitarianism states that we ought to do whatever increases the most overall well-being. It follows that the wrongness or rightness of an action depends solely on whether its outcome is optimific. As Shafer Landau points out, utilitarianism dismisses completely the intrinsic moral feature of an action, for the only thing matters is its contribution to the well-being of the society. My belief aligns with utilitarian’s point of view on this matter. There are many cases where strict adherence to a moral belief, such as the one condemning torture or killing of the innocents, would cause greater sufferings. For instance, torturing terrorists, although controversial, is sometimes the only option to save millions of lives. However, this is not to say torturing terrorist would forever remain morally right. If future technology is able to extract information from terrorists without having to impose such discomfort and pain to them, torturing terrorists would then be immoral as the alternative would produce greater overall well-being.
Shafer Landau also presents a hypothetical situation where utilitarianism’s rejection of intrinsic wrongness is seriously challenged. His example portrays an innocent guy who is living a relatively miserable life. The author argues that if we take away this person’s life without leaving any outcry in the public, our action would be morally right as it helps society reduce misery. Utilitarian would have to deem this act of killing obligatory, since the man’s life “was lowering the overall level of well-being in the world” and that without him, “that level rises”. At a glance, this example seems like a serious problem to which utilitarianism cannot provide a justified answer. However, I believe the example is intentionally misleading when it considers the man’s contribution to the overall well-being as a negative value. Judging from the details given in the text, this man doesn’t impose any harm, threat or any negative impact to others around him. Thus, that his life isn’t happy doesn’t mean he reduces the overall well-being of the society. Furthermore, saying “the world would contain less misery if he were to die” is a hasty assumption. It ignores the grief his family and friends would suffer from his supposedly natural death, and also the loss of value of that person’s life, given that his life is treasurable to him. In short, this guy may add little, or even none to the society’s well-being, but there’s not enough evidence to say he decreases it.
We have learnt about absolutism from previous readings. Utilitarianism is simply a rejection to absolutism, which states that certain actions are absolutely right or wrong, regardless of the circumstances. However, circumstances certainly do influence actions. Even utilitarianism is not absolutely the optimal choice when it is used as motivation, as discussed on page 138 of Shafer Landau’s book. As a result, judging any action without considering its situation would be inadequate.
The article did an excellent job of explaining and challenging Shchafer-Landau's ideas, but I think you may have slightly missed the point of his hypothetical scenario of euthanize the unhappy man. I think he was more suggesting that the man's life was so consistently miserable that he himself lowered the average level of happiness. And although it is difficult to imagine someone dying without having a negative impact on those who care about them, I think S-L was trying to ignore them for the duration of this thought experiment. Imagine if the man was a hermit. Still, even in that scenario, many people would still likely disagree with killing the man, which would be an argument against utilitarianism.
ReplyDeleteThis scenario of "killing the miserable man" is an interesting one to think about in terms of utilitarianism. I think all of our struggles to accept that killing this man would be an obligation to the well being of the rest of the world is why Shafer-Landau put this example in the problems with consequentialism section. Our human conscience wants to tell us that killing an innocent person is wrong no matter what, and that we should always think this is true. That is a key example of intrinisic rightness. Consequentialism rejects that there are intrinsic right or wrongs, but only what is good for the majority of people. I personally disagree with this, and think that it is wrong to kill the miserable man because it specifically says that the man wants to live. I also have a problem with this scenario in that it seems the only misery the man is causing is to himself. He is not bringing misery to others or harming others; just having miserable experiences in his own world. However, this man continues to live and want to live. Therefore, I see no justification in killing him, and no proof that the world would be better without him, or if there is any, it is negligible.
ReplyDeleteWhen I first read about Utilitarianism, I was encouraged. I believed that this metaethical theory was able to, at least some extent, satisfy my objectivist mentality while introducing common sense ethics. Utilitarians believe that torturing a terrorist is morally right if it results in positive consequences. All in all, this theory seemed to support objectivism, while at the same time, allowing for human reason and circumstantial analysis to decide the morality of a certain action. However, as I continued to think about it, I realized that my inherent beliefs cause me to believe that actions are intrinsically right or wrong. I do believe that a lot of the time this can be circumstantial, which is why the utilitarianism theory excited me, but I cannot let myself accept the idea that all actions have no intrinsic moral features. As of now, I stand somewhere in between utilitarianism and objectivism, with a mix of both. Additionally, the scenario of "killing the miserable man" is another reason for why I cannot fully buy into the ideology of utilitarianism.
ReplyDeleteSeveral points are raised in Hien's post and these comments that are worth addressing, but I will just contribute one clarification.
DeleteRegarding Andrew's post, the description of your initial attraction and later reservations about utilitarianism makes sense and raises qualms worth considering. The circumstantial/ context-sensitive nature of utilitarianism is an attraction. But because this theory entails that nothing can really be said to be intrinsically right or wrong - wrong because of what it is rather than wrong because of what it causes - you're not entirely satisfied with the theory. As we move forward, you might find that the more principled structure of Kantian ethics or the pluralistic characteristics of prima facie principles will better match your views.
But there is some confusion about the relationship between metaethics and normative ethics that should be corrected as a terminological matter. Utilitarianism is NOT a METAethical theory; it is a NORMATIVE ethical theory. Objectivism IS a METAethical theory, NOT a NORMATIVE ethical theory. So there is no space "between" utilitarianism and objectivism - they are theories about different things.
Objectivism claims (against relativism and nihilism) that there are some truths in ethics independent of what anyone happens to think. This is the only metaethical theory that allows us to say that something could be morally wrong (or right) even if every actual thinker believed otherwise. There may have been times in human history when everyone alive believed the planet was flat. They were wrong. Similarly, there may have been times in human history when everyone believed that slavery was permissible. If objectivism is true, they were (I'm pretty sure) wrong. So objectivism allows us to say there are some moral truths, but it tells us nothing about what those truths are.
Theories of normative ethics (utilitarianism, deontology, virtue theory) are not claims about the existence or status of moral truths. The simplest story about the relationship between normative ethics and metaethics is to say that all normative ethical theories presuppose the truth of objectivism in metaethics. Consequentialists, Kantians, Rossians, and Aristotelians are all objectivists. They agree that there are moral truths; they disagree about what those truths are.