Russ
Shafer-Landau argues that the notion of impartiality is both good and
bad for the theory of utilitarianism. Utilitarianism holds that
well-being “is the only thing that is intrinsically valuable”,
and that “an action us morally required just because it does more
to improve overall well-being than any other action you could have
done in the circumstances” (Shafer-Landau, 120). In part, this
sub-theory is constructed around the idea of impartiality in how we
treat all others. As Shafer-Landau argues, it seems right that we
favor those closest to us over those that we do not know. Still, he
makes an argument about the flaw in this notion in an example about
slavery. Shafer-Landau argues that, since utilitarianism considers
everyone's well-being equally, if enough people in a society held
onto the idea of slavery it could be “required” that the society
continue the practice. It seems that, upon weighing all of the harms
to slaves and benefits to slave owners with one another, if more
benefits seem to come from the act, then the act is required by
utilitarianism. This shows a major drawback to the theory as a whole.
This
section in particular made me think of well-being of humans weighed
against the well-being of animals. If utilitarians believe in
impartiality but also in doing the act that improves overall
well-being, then would the satisfaction and gustatory pleasures of
eating meat require that people kill animals? This somewhat goes back
to another problem that Shafer-Landau raised about the theory, which
is the issue of measuring well-being. Also, things get confusing (at
least for me) once we try to reconcile “faring poorly” and
increasing well-being in our actions. With my example, well-being
could be increased by killing and eating the animals which could be
the right action, but no matter what, is it not wrong that we are
causing the animals to “fare poorly”? We obviously could have
chosen not to kill and eat the animals, but isn't it a subjective
decision as to which act would have increased the most well-being? It
seems to me that in some cases, acts can be both right and wrong
under utilitarianism. But maybe I'm missing something?
I think that the final section in chapter 9 entitled, The Scope of the Moral Community, might really help clear up this debate raised by T’Kia regarding animal rights in utilitarianism. Within this reading, utilitarianism defines members of the moral community as things that are important in their own right, and are therefore owed respect. More importantly, he states that animals are indeed members of this moral community: “Animals count because they can suffer.” (Shafer-Landau 2010, 129) I understand T’Kia raising the argument that personal gustatory satisfaction for individuals eating animals justifies the action, because the primary concern for utilitarians is the end result. However, I believe that the animals being members of the moral community solves this dilemma because it takes into consideration their well-being.
ReplyDeleteShafer-Landau goes on to explain that sometimes in utilitarianism, some suffering may occur so that the end result is beneficial. However, the key point in this argument is that “we are not allowed to ignore the suffering of others. It doesn’t matter whether the victims are human beings or not.” (Shafer-Landau 2010, 129) Shafer-Landau goes on to uphold this decision with the Argument from Marginal Cases, wherein he compares marginal humans to animals not only because of some of their abilities but mainly because they can both feel suffering. Therefore, according to utilitarianism, it is wrong to mistreat animals because, like humans, they are equal members of the moral community and their suffering should not be ignored.
Works Cited
1. Landau, Russ. "Chapter 9-Consequentialism: Its Nature and Attractions." In The fundamentals of ethics. Second ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 117-132.
In the Fundamental of Ethics by Shafer-Landau, impartiality is viewed as an attractive trait for utilitarianism (Shafer-Landau, 124). However, I find that impartiality is a flaw. When it comes towards treating animals as part of the moral community, impartiality does not seem to be a very realistic requirement for animals. If animals are included in the moral community, how could they fulfill the moral requirements of utilitarianism? I see how in certain situations, for the greater good, it is morally required for individuals to not favor others. If animals are considered moral equals, I find it hard to believe that animals could be impartial towards people and vice versa. For example, I don't believe a lioness would opt to eat berries instead of an antelope (or a person)if both choices are readily available. I also find it very unlike that a mother bear would risk the life of her cub to save a group of people. In effect, why should people choose to remain impartial where other "equal" members of the community cannot. I also am curious towards what qualifies as "suffering" and who/what can suffer?
ReplyDeleteGreat questions and comments raised. We will discuss these in class today.
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