Tuesday, January 29, 2013

How Just are Traditions?

In his The Fundamentals of Ethics, Russ Shafer-Landau discusses morality through the fascinating and intangible, or well, less tangible science of philosophy. The introductory chapter briefly touches on the contents of the book, breaking it down into three sections: value theory, normative ethics, and metaethics. Throughout the introduction he continues to note skepticisms about morality and addresses common “moral” misconceptions like the existence of ethics from an atheist’s perspective, when there’s no God to enforce the rules. Shafer-Landau suggests (but doesn’t actually prove) that morality is inborn and that there is a moral absolute in ethics.
While morality is objective, differing from the cold, hard facts of biological sciences, it is still based in truth and fact and should not be considered a “rationaliz[ation of]… our gut feelings”(5).
The most intriguing point that Shafer-Landau presents, however, is a list of constraints that shape our morals. Among them he lists, “Neither the law nor tradition is immune from moral criticism”, “Everyone is morally fallible”, “We are not obligated to do the impossible”,  “Children bear less moral responsibility than adults”, and “Self-interest isn’t the only ethical consideration” (6). While these examples are not the entirety of the list that Shafer-Landau created, they are all statements that evoke critical thinking and require the reader to think twice.
 As a reader new to philosophy, I took particular interest in the idea that norms can be challenged. For example, just because a cultural or familial tradition has been long practiced, that does not mean it’s moral or right. That doesn’t make it bad, but instead, just the way it is. Specifically, consider the establishment of annual recruitment practices amongst Greek fraternities and sororities across the country: “rush” has been practiced in these organizations for nearly two centuries and more modernly anti-hazing practices have been established to protect new members. Some of these practices include covering all pictures of members of the opposite sex, including family members, and removing all traces of any religious or political affiliation to make potential new members feel as comfortable as possible during rush. One could say that requiring a member to abide by these rules is unjust because it is an infringement on her first amendment rights, the freedom of expression. But even if these rules or customs are morally corrupt, they still exist for a purpose and will continue to exist regardless of ethical standing. 

1 comment:

  1. I agree with the idea that traditions do not always uphold ethical behavior. Your insight towards some of the recruitment activities that take place during rush in Greek fraternities and sororities have not always upheld good moral standing. Some of the rules that have been established to promote an anti-hazing environment seems to protect one group's rights while infringing upon the other group. I think this is a good example of how society, in this case fraternities and sororities, establishes laws that aim to protect people against extremely dangerous activities but consequently limits their freedom of choice. It seems that ethics can provide a rough guide to uphold the belief that the individual is inherently moral but I believe that depends on the environment that one lives in.

    I also pondered Landau's list of ethical constraints. He mentions twelve constraints to guide ethical behavior and also states that these guidelines ...are [not] beyond criticism" (pg 7). After reviewing his short list, I immediately questioned the explanations for one of the guidelines provided by the author.

    Landau states that "equals ought to be treated equally", however his following explanation for this guideline illustrates that "People who are alike...should get similar treatment" (6). Is this ethical constraint valid under any circumstance? I am not convinced that this particular constraint can remain valid under the circumstance that equality and similarity are not perfectly interchangeable terms. In my opinion, Landau's explanation implicitly inserts a hierarchy of fair treatment.

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