In
“Proof”, written by Renford Bambrough, a scenario is proposed in
support of the existence of moral knowledge. Bambrough poses that
there is a child in need of surgery that would be painful for him in
the absence of anesthesia, and as Bambrough sees it, there is not
doubt that this child should receive it (as cited in Shafer-Landau,
2012, p.218). As someone with beliefs more aligned with moral
skepticism, I wondered whether or not this really was objective proof
of moral truths. As risky as it may be, I thought that I would at
least enter the conversation on this matter.
Just
today I found an article about the health risks to recovery room
hospital staff associated with exposure to waste anesthetic gas
exhaled by recovering patients (Cook, 2013). “Beware the Hidden
Dangers of Anesthesia” starts off by stating that anesthesia in the
operating room isn't the only area where these gases can cause harm,
and that even nurses in the recovery room may be at risk of exposure
to these gases which have potentially harmful health effects (Cook,
2013). These effects include mild problems such as nausea and
headaches, but also more serious complications like sterility,
miscarriages, cancer, and liver disease (Cook, 2013). The National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health claims that this problem
is even more pronounced in facilities that lack proper ventilation,
and the organization also suggests that systems be developed that
monitor the concentration level of anesthetic gases in breathing
zones (Cook, 2013).
Now,
you may be asking, why does this matter? Well, let's return to the
scenario about the child set to undergo that painful surgery. With
his assertion in the moral truth that this child should receive
anesthesia, Bambrough seems to be completely sold that no
circumstance exists where this cannot be true. Here, he is attempting
to prove that we do possess moral knowledge, because Bambrough
himself “knows”
that giving the anesthesia is the thing to do (as cited in
Shafer-Landau, 2012, p.218). What if, however, another's health (or
the health of several people) were also at risk? The article shows
that this is another plausible situation, so what if we were to add
this into the conversation? What then? Could Bambrough know
that this child should be given the anesthesia then-- even at the
expense of other people's healths? This would turn into a dilemma
about the life of one over the life of many.
In
this modified example, I am not arguing that the child should not be
given anesthesia. I am only adding a plausible, real-world complexity
to the situation in which Bambrough creates. In doing this, I at
least hope to show that the situation doesn't seem as clear cut as he
would like for the reader to think, and that there actually is still
room for doubt about what to do in this situation.
Sources:
Bambrough,
Renford. (1979). Proof. In Russ Shafer-Landau (Ed.), The Ethical
Life (pp. 217-226). Oxford University Press.
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